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Abstract
This paper studies the political prospects for reform in a model where the tax base
and statutory rate are separate instruments of tax policy. The model suggests that large
changes in the tax code may be easier to enact than marginal reforms. The tax base
faces a tipping point where even the beneficiaries from tax exemptions support reform.
At this tipping point, tax reform is Pareto improving. Politically feasible tax reform
occurs when fiscal needs are large, but may nonetheless involve reductions in marginal
tax rates. There is strategic complementary in lobbying for tax exemptions, resulting
in multiple equilibria. The model’s main predictions are consistent with recent tax
reforms in OECD countries. JEL Codes: D72, D78, H26
1 Introduction
The politics of tax reform are taking center stage once again, just as public debts are
mounting worldwide. Congress passed a substantial change to the U.S. tax code in De-
cember 2017; calls for tax reform have also emerged in Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Greece
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following the debt crisis in Southern Europe. Tax reform was a centerpiece of the legisla-
tive agenda of the current Indian parliament. Frequently, tax reform involves changes not
only in tax rates, but also in the tax base. Proposals eliminating exemptions or closing
loopholes involve a change in the tax base. Indeed, expanding the tax base was central
to the most successful reforms in recent history. For example, the landmark 1986 U.S. tax
reform eliminated exemptions to both corporate and personal taxes.
Reviewing the history of any major tax reform, one sees immediately that broadening
the tax base, while often economically desirable, is also politically contentious. (See Birn-
baum and Murray, 1987 on the politics of the U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986.) An interest
group that was powerful enough to secure a tax exemption is sure to resist attempts to
eliminate this exemption when reform is on the table. This paper explores the political
determinants of the tax base. To this end, I propose a model where a government meets
its revenue needs through a choice of not only the tax rate, but also the tax base. These
two policy dimensions appear important in actual reforms and are central to the discus-
sion in this paper. This framework allows us to evaluate individuals’ preferences for tax
exemptions and the tradeoff between the two policy dimensions. In the model, all agents
and goods are identical ex-ante and there is no economic rationale for tax exemptions. A
broader tax base is more efficient, as it removes a wedge between the prices of taxed- and
tax-exempt goods. However, in political equilibrium, certain goods may nevertheless be
exempt from taxation. The rents from tax exemptions are large and concentrated, while
their costs are diffuse. Therefore, a special interest may attempt to secure a tax break de-
spite the inefficiency it creates. This phenomenon is familiar from our understanding of
special interest politics. (See Grossman and Helpman, 2002.)
The novelty here is the study of the budgetary and general equilibrium implications
of the inefficient policies that result and their political repercussions. While a tax exemp-
tion increases the relative demand for a good, the resulting inefficiencies reduce aggregate
demand. The model yields a simple expression that quantifies the general equilibrium
losses borne directly by the beneficiaries of tax exemptions. When inefficiencies in the tax
code reach a critical point, special interests themselves are willing to forgo their tax breaks
in favor of tax reform: the elimination of all tax exemptions. Importantly, no (small) spe-
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cial interest would forgo its tax break in isolation. The rents from a single exemption are
large, but the budgetary and general equilibrium gains from its elimination are negligible.
At the same time, a broad coalition of special interests may agree collectively to give up
their tax breaks for tax reform. I derive the (minimum) coalition size that would collec-
tively forgo its tax exemptions for the enactment of tax reform. I show that the size of this
coalition is decreasing in the government’s fiscal needs. Hence, the scope for tax reform is
greater when the government wishes to raise more revenues.
The economic framework outlined in Section 3 yields a number of results that inform
the political analysis that follows. First, there always exists a tax base breadth, below
which a coalition of all special interests would collectively forgo their tax exemptions in
favor of full reform–the elimination of all tax breaks. As the tax base narrows, the private
benefits of tax exemptions grow roughly linearly, while deadweight losses grow exponen-
tially. Hence, there is always a tipping point where the private cost of an unreformed tax
system outweighs its benefits, even to the very beneficiaries of tax exemptions. Second,
the minimal size of this reform coalition is decreasing in public good needs. As fiscal
strain increases, a smaller number of special interests needs to be persuaded to forgo their
tax breaks and prospects for tax reform are greater. Third, tax exemptions are strategic
complements: the private benefits of a tax exemption are increasing in the total number
of allocated exemptions.
Turning to politics, I study normative (Section 4) and positive (Section 5) implications
of this economic framework. The main normative result is that a reform-minded policy-
maker, constrained by the need to compensate losers from reform, should opt for large,
“big bang”, reforms rather than gradual changes in the tax base. This follows from the
complementarity of private benefits from tax exemptions. Eliminating an individual, or
small set, of exemptions is very costly when the tax base is narrow, but less so when the
tax base is broadened in one fell swoop. At the extreme, the general equilibrium gains
from a big bang reform are sufficient to fully compensate losers and a large reform is
Pareto improving. This is of course a limiting case: real world reforms typically have
losers alongside winners. But this result emphasizes that both the benefits to winners are
larger and the cost to each individual loser is smaller when a more ambitious reform is
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envisaged.
The positive analysis considers equilibrium policy in a standard lobbying model (fol-
lowing Grossman and Helpman, 2002, chapter 7). Results are robust to a variety of collec-
tive choice frameworks, but lobbying captures succinctly the conflict between special- and
general-interests, central to the politics of tax reform. The main positive prediction is that
tax reform is more likely when fiscal pressures are greater. Further, I extend the lobbying
model to allow endogenous entry into lobbying. Given the strategic complementarity in
tax exemptions, endogenous entry leads to multiple equilibria. If many citizens join the
special interest group (SIG), the SIG vies for many tax exemptions. This increases the pri-
vate value of each individual exemption, validating citizens’ choice to join the SIG. On the
other hand, if few citizens join the SIG, the value of tax exemptions is small and citizens
have a smaller incentive to organize.
A large literature studies the political forces shaping tax policy.1 Homing in on the
tax base is motivated by the prominence of the tax base in major tax reforms in recent
decades. Broadening the tax base was one of the main objectives of the Tax Reform Act of
1986 in United States. Value-Added-Tax reforms in Canada and Sweden, both enacted in
1991, involved significant expansions of the tax base. Corporate tax reforms in the United
Kingdom in 1984 and in Germany in 2000 similarly involved substantial broadening of
the base. Existing theories of the political economy of taxation typically take the tax base
as exogenous and usually as comprehensive. The large normative literature building on
Mirrlees (1971) has individuals each taxed at a distinct rate and it is difficult to distinguish
the tax base from the continuum of statutory rates. Given the prominence of the tax base
in reform proposals, a model that makes this distinction explicit leads to new insights on
the politics of taxation.2
The economic framework builds on models of tax enforcement, following Yitzhaki
(1979), Wilson (1989), and Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002). I abstract from enforcement and
focus on the political, rather than administrative, constraints to expanding the tax base. I
1See Alt et al (2009) and Persson and Tabellini (2002) for comprehensive literature reviews.
2There is also a long tradition in public economics that assumes that the tax system can only be altered
on the margin due to political constraints. See Dixit (1975), Feldstein (1976), and more recently Golosov,
Tsyvinski, and Werquin (2014). Here, I allow for reforms of any magnitude.
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augment existing models with endogenous production and explicit attention to the dis-
tributional implications of a narrow tax base. The latter extension creates special interests
seeking preferential tax treatment. The former creates general equilibrium costs of a nar-
row tax base. Importantly, the focus of this article is on the politics rather than merely the
economics of the tax base.
The paper also relates to the literature on the politics of economic reform3 and more
generally to the large literature on the role of special interest politics, the nexus between
political and economic power, and public choice mechanisms. A common thread in this
literature is the tension between particularistic interests and overall economic efficiency.
A similar tension is present in this paper as well, but it differs in its general equilibrium
setting. General equilibrium allows us to compare the individual losses with the general
equilibrium gains from base-broadening tax reforms. This provides new insights, such as
complementarity in special interests’ lobbying incentives. Base-broadening tax reforms
are just one instance of policy reform albeit one where we can cast light on the persistence
of inefficient policy more generally. Illustrating these general points through the lens of
tax policy has a number of advantages. First, the dead-weight losses of inefficient tax
policies are readily assessed in a familiar public finance context, as are the benefits of
tax provisions targeted to special interests. Second, tax exemptions are a popular vehicle
for targeting special interests in practice. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO, 2013)
estimates that the United States Treasury forgoes over one third of potential individual
income tax revenues through “tax expenditures”. This sum is similar in magnitude to all
discretionary spending in the U.S.4 Given the sums involved, it is of independent interest
to understand the politics of tax exemptions.5
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section, I describe
a number of tax reforms in recent history. This narrative highlights the importance of the
tax base in tax reforms and relates these reforms to the theory that follows. Appendix A.2
formalizes this analysis using data on corporate tax legislation in OECD countries. Section
3See Acemoglu and Robinson (2000); Alesina and Drazen (1991); Fernandez and Rodrick (1991); and Jain
and Mukhand (2003). For a recent contribution in the context of tax policy, see Scheuer and Wolitzky (2016).
4GAO estimates: http://www.gao.gov/key issues/tax expenditures/issue summary
5Tax expenditures are not uniquely a U.S. phenomenon. Tax expenditures in Australia and Italy are
estimated at 8% of GDP, 6% in the U.K., and 4% in Spain, for example. Source: Tyson (2014).
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3 describes the model’s economic environment and derives citizens’ policy preferences.
Section 4 describes normative political implications and section 5 turns to positive political
analysis. Section 6 concludes. Proofs, robustness checks, and extensions are in the online
appendix.
2 Base Broadening Reforms in Recent History
A few of the most prominent reforms in modern history involved expansions of the tax
base, motivating the theory that follows. These tax reforms were often triggered by fiscal
strain. In addition, tax reforms were ambitious and involved reduction in marginal tax
rates alongside base-broadening policies. Analysis in Appendix A.2. shows that these
anecdotes generalize to the tax-reform experiences of a panel of OECD countries in re-
forming the tax base.
United States The landmark U.S. tax reform of the past several decades was the Tax
Reform Act (TRA) of 1986. Its main objectives were to simplify the tax code, broaden the
tax base and increase fairness, primarily considering horizontal equity. Revenue needs
were perceived to be great at the time, with a federal budget deficit in excess of 5% of GDP
that year. Some prominent Republican leaders, including Senate Majority Leader Robert
Dole, initially opposed revenue-neutral tax reform because they believed that deficit re-
duction should take priority (Birnbaum and Murray 1987, Kindle Loc. 301).
Ultimately, reform was nonetheless designed to be revenue-neutral, with significant
reductions in marginal tax rates combined with base-broadening measures. Accounts of
the political process suggest that a combination of tax rate cuts and broadening the tax
base were necessary for the enactment of the TRA. As Birnbaum and Murray (1987) state:
“Merging the lower rates of the supply-siders with the base-broadening of the
liberal tax reformers was the glue that held the 1986 tax bill together. . . The
ability of this unholy alliance to stick together throughout an arduous pro-
cess. . . was the key to success.” Kindle Loc. 162.
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The change in the tax code was significant, rather than minor, with top marginal per-
sonal income tax rates dropping from 50% to 28%. Again, Birnbaum and Murray (1987)
write:
“Congress was a slow and cumbersome institution that usually made only
piecemeal, incremental changes. Tax reform proposed something very differ-
ent: a radical revamping of the entire tax structure.” Kindle Loc. 504.
Finally, some special interests were unsurprisingly opposed to tax reform, protective
of their own tax exemptions, such as
“...the chairman of Texaco, who was concerned about oil-and-gas tax breaks;
the chairman of the Ford Motor Company, who worried about the end of in-
vestment incentives; the president of the National Federation of Independent
Business, who was disturbed by the elimination of lower tax rates for small
businesses... ” Kindle Loc. 2022.
However, there were also some that supported tax reform for the very general equilibrium
arguments advanced in this paper:
“A small group of others—like Roger Smith of GM—thought tax reform would
be good for their customers and encourage sales. ” Kindle Loc. 2034.
Canada In Canada, tax reform also passed amidst fiscal consolidation, yet involved
reduction in marginal tax rates. The “1985 Plan” to reform the tax code came amidst a
significant effort to consolidate the Federal budget. (See Sancak et al, 2011.) This led to
legislation in 1987 that broadened the personal and corporate tax base and eliminated
deductions, while lowering corporate tax rates. The second phase of tax reform was in-
troduced in 1991, with a sales tax reform. The reform replaced the 13.5% Manufacturers’
Sales Tax with a 5% Goods and Services Tax and introduced a more transparent tax that
provided a more equal treatment of business, thus broadening the sales-tax base alongside
the lower tax rates.
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Germany The German tax reform of 2000—passed after a decade of debates—was
discussed in the context of fiscal consolidation. Chancellor Gerhard Shroeder’s initial pro-
posals were for fiscal consolidation and tax cuts. (See IMF, 1999; IMF, 2000; and Breuer et
al, 2011.) These aims would appear inconsistent, but can be reconciled in the theory pro-
vided here. Prior to the reform, the corporate tax base was so narrow that the 45% statu-
tory rate on retained earnings raised only 2% of GDP in revenues (IMF, 2000). Corporate
tax reform involved broadening the tax base, limitations to depreciation allowances, and
lowering top marginal tax rates. Personal income tax rates were also decreased, although
without substantial changes in the tax base.
Latin America Mahon (2004) and Focanti et al (2013) conduct panel regressions of
determinants of tax reform in Latin America and both find that high inflation was the main
domestic driver of tax reform. Given that high inflation in the region has often been due
to fiscal pressures, this too is consistent with the theory that revenue needs stimulate tax
reform. Sanchez (2006) reviews the history of–and political forces motivating–tax reform
in Latin America. He describes tax reforms undertaken in Latin America over the past
three decades “to create simpler, more efficient tax systems with a greater emphasis on
indirect taxes of broader bases, and more moderate marginal tax rates,” (pp. 772). He also
cites the debt crises of the 1980s as the leading domestic forces towards reform.
Sweden The Swedish tax reform of 1991 was dubbed by some the “tax reform of the
century,” (Agell et al, 1996). The reform involved a significant reduction in personal in-
come tax rates, estimated to lose as much as six percent of GDP in tax revenues. A large
part of these reductions in marginal tax rates was financed by broadening the VAT tax
base. Tax reform passed in the aftermath of a fiscal crisis, with the debt to GDP ratio in-
creasing from 40% of GDP in 1980 to over 60% by the middle of the decade and a currency
crisis following at the end of the decade.
United Kingdom In the United Kingdom, tax reform was also stimulated by debt
consolidation attempts. (See Ahnert et al, 2011.) In 1980, the Thatcher government faced a
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fiscal deficit of 4.8%. After failed attempts by his predecessor to rein in the deficit, Chan-
cellor Nigel Lawson presented a plan in 1984 that envisaged deficit reduction of nearly
four percentage points. The lion’s share of the consolidation came on the expenditure
side, while tax reform measures were planned to be roughly revenue neutral. The re-
form package included reducing the corporation tax rate from 52% to 35%, financed by
base-broadening measures.
In summary, several of the largest tax reforms involved broadening the tax base and
have a number of common features. They occur when fiscal needs are perceived to be
large. They typically finance reductions in marginal tax rates. And reforms were often
comprehensive, eliminating many tax breaks in one fell swoop, rather that gradualist.6
3 The Economy
This section outlines the economic framework, how the economy responds to tax policy,
and citizens’ resulting policy preferences. The economic model builds on a normative
literature of the optimal tax base in public finance: Yitzhaki (1979), Wilson (1989), and
Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002). Citizens have CES preferences over the consumption of
a measure-one continuum of goods varieties. Income is taxed at a statutory tax rate τ,
but some goods are deductible from taxation. The measure of exempt goods is given by
1− f , so that f is a measure of the tax base. This gives two clear dimensions to tax policy:
statutory rates and the tax base.7
The model that follows differs from the aforementioned papers by adding three gen-
eral equilibrium components, each of which is essential to the discussion. First, competi-
6As this paper was being finalized (in December 2017), Congress passed a substantial change to the
personal and corporate income tax code. It is too early to assess its economic impact or the politics that led
to its passage. I nevertheless discuss some of its base-broadening provisions in the context of the theory
in the following section. This reform too was substantial, rather than marginal. However, analysis of the
politics of this reform in the context of base-broadening measures is complicated by the fact that tax cuts
were primarily deficit funded, with the CBO estimating a $1.5 trillion increase in public debt, with only a
small share of revenues coming from tax base increases (see https://www.cbo.gov/publication/53415). As
such, the politics of this reform relate more to the traditional literature on the political economy of public
debt (See Alesina and Passalacqua, 2016 for a review).
7The model is isomorphic to one where a statutory consumption tax is applied to a measure f of goods
and 1− f goods are exempt.
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tion in the goods market is monopolistic. This gives producers profits that are increasing
in the demand for their product. Producers therefore have a vested interest in securing a
tax break for their variety. Second, production is endogenous, with an elastically-supplied
labor input. This contrasts with the endowment economy in the aforementioned public fi-
nance literature. With endogenous output, tax policy affects aggregate demand and hence
firms’ profits. The tension between the rents from individual breaks and the aggregate-
demand costs of a narrow tax base are central to the analysis. Finally, while the existing
literature is normative, the focus here is on the political factors affecting tax policy. In this
section, we take policy as given; the political determinants of policy are then studied in
the following sections.
3.1 Model Setup
Agents and Preferences The economy contains a continuum of ex-ante identical cit-
izens of unit measure indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. Each citizen is a worker, consumer, and
entrepreneur–terms that I will use interchangeably. A citizen j values streams of con-
sumption xj and hours worked hj according to the function






Citizens’ Income The citizen receives a wage of w units of the consumption good
for each hour worked. Citizen j also earns profits π j from a single firm she owns; it is
one of a unit measure of firms indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Firms’ indexes match their owners’.
The non-diversified ownership structure is somewhat stark, as is the assumption that all
citizens derive positive profit income. As I discuss in section 3.2, this framework can easily
accommodate any other ownership structure.
Consumption and Intermediate Goods Each firm produces a single intermediate
good variety, sold at a price p (i). Let xj (i) denote consumer j’s demand for variety i.













with ε ≥ 1 giving the elasticity of substitution across varieties.
Tax Policy The government must raise sufficient tax revenues to finance an exoge-
nously given amount of public goods g.8 I show in Appendix A.3 that the model’s results
are unchanged if public good demand is endogenous. Tax policy consists of two instru-
ments: the tax rate τ and the tax base f . Personal income whj + π j is taxed at a uniform
rate τ. However, varieties of intermediate goods in i ∈ [ f , 1] are fully deductible from
income taxation.9
There is no economic rationale to provide a tax exemption to any specific variety, given
that intermediate goods are identical (e.g. in their price elasticity of demand). The theory
of uniform commodity taxation, harking back to Ramsey (1927), suggests that a social wel-
fare maximizer would set f = 1. Moreover, unlike the literature on the optimal tax base, I
assume no administrative costs to tax enforcement.10 Any deviation from a complete tax
base is therefore due political, rather than economic, forces.
This tax structure captures realistic features of the tax code, namely that tax exemp-
tions can be individually targeted to special interests, but also that such exemptions tend
to provide a discrete, rather than a marginal, benefit to their recipients. Allowing for a
continuum of tax breaks would muddle the distinction between the tax base and the tax
rate, but in Appendix A.4, I allow for partial deductions and in Appendix A.5 allow for
the tax system to be determined endogenously, with a policymaker who can set the size
and of exemptions freely. I show there that the main insights do not rely on 100% exemp-
8I assume that the public good is of a specific variety, i = 1, and that this good is always exempt from
taxation. The government purchases this good from firm i = 1 at a price of 1, which I will later show to be
the market price of the good in the absence of government intervention. In other words, the government
does not exploit its market power to affect the public good’s price, nor can the firm exploit its position as
the monopolistic provider of the public good to charge an unusually high markup. The assumption that the
government purchases a specific variety is for analytical convenience, but does not affect any of the insights
delivered by the model.
9Identifying tax exempt goods as those with higher i indexes is for notational convenience and without
loss of generality.
10Allowing for administrative costs would not alter the model’s results and would unnecessarily obfus-
cate the political motivations for a narrow tax base.
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tions. In any case, administrative factors may limit the number of existing tax brackets in
practice: see Hettich and Winer (1984) for a discussion.
Modeling the tax base in this way mirrors the main “holes” in the U.S. income tax
base. The largest tax exemptions include mortgage interest deduction ($59 billion in fiscal
year 2014) and exclusion of employer provided health insurance ($202 billion in fiscal year
2015).11 Income used for the purchase of these goods is (partially) deductible from income
taxation.12
Budget Constraint and Consumer Choice Given tax policy {τ, f } , the consumer’s
budget constraint is given by
∫ 1
i=0











p (i) xj (i) di︸ ︷︷ ︸
Tax deduction
(2)





supply hj, subject to (2).
Consumption Bundle and Demand for Varieties Consumer demand for individual
varieties is given by
xj (i) =
(





where τ (i) is the statutory rate τ for all goods in the tax base i ∈ [0, f ) and zero for all












Firms Each firm i has a technology that transforms h (i) units of labor into zh (i) units
of good i. Firms are identical in their productivity (firms with heterogeneous productiv-
ities are studied in Appendix A.6). Each firm faces a fully competitive labor market, but
11GAO estimates. See http://www.gao.gov/key issues/tax expenditures/issue summary
12There are also exemptions in the corporate tax code. The theory as outlined here doesn’t include a
corporate tax and thus no corporate tax exemptions. Similar forces impeding or driving reform could be
modeled in that setting as well.
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a monopolistically competitive (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) goods market. Each firm hires
workers at the market wage w and sells its intermediate good at price p (i). Profit maxi-
mization gives the standard result that prices are set at a constant markup µ ≡ εε−1 over
marginal costs: p (i) = µ wz .
Normalizing the producer price (identical for all firms) to one, the consumer price
index (3) can be written as pc = 11−τ̂ , where τ̂ is the effective tax rate defined as
1− τ̂ ≡
[
f (1− τ)ε−1 + (1− f )
] 1
ε−1 .
The labor wedge is equal to the effective tax rate. It is useful to anticipate at this point
that raising one unit of revenues via an increase in the statutory tax rate τ will always
increase the effective tax rate by more than raising the unit of revenues via an expansion
of the tax base f . Thus increases in tax rates are less efficient than broadening the tax base.
Finally, firms’ profits are directly proportional to demand for their varieties: π (i) =
µ−1
µ x (i).
Government The government collects tax revenues
ρ = τ
(
wh + π −
∫ 1
i= f
p (i) x (i) di
)
, (4)
which are income tax revenues net of deductions. The government uses these revenues to
supply the public good, so that ρ ≥ g.
Labor Supply and Consumption Workers’ first order condition for labor supply
gives






Consumer j’s consumption can now be written as
xj = (1− τ̂) (wh + π (j)) . (6)
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Indirect Utility The utility of citizen j is given by (1). hj is determined by (5) and xj












This indirect utility function can be separated into two easily-interpretable terms. The
first reflects the utility derived from labor effort; the second, utility derived from profits.
Given that these two terms are additively separable, it is easy to adapt the model to other
assumptions about the distribution of ownership, monopoly rents, and income in society.








gives the utility of consumption from labor income net of the dis-utility of supplying this
labor: (1− τ̂)wh− h
1+ 1η
1+ 1η
. It is immediately apparent that the labor component of utility is
the same for all citizens. In addition, the effects of tax policy on this component of utility
is entirely captured by the effective tax rate τ̂. Raising a unit of revenues by increasing
the statutory tax rate τ increases the effective tax rate τ̂ by more than raising revenues
through a broadening of the tax base f . Hence, if households obtained no profit income,
they’d always prefer the broadest possible tax base.14
The second term








(1− τ̂)ε−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Relative Demand
(8)
gives the citizens utility due to profits: (1− τ̂)π (j). Profits from the total sales of vari-
13Although µ is a function of ε, I treat the two as separate parameters in what follows. This is without loss
of generality as it leaves µ = εε−1 as a special case. De-linking markups from the elasticity of substitution
is readily obtained in a model with a two-tiered CES with the markup deriving from the elasticity of sub-
stitution between closely-substitutable varieties within industries. De-linking the two parameters allows
separate comparative statics for the two.
14This stark result is due to the fact that the “worker” component of the household as defined here doesn’t
include any monopoly rents. In a world where workers share in their employer’s monopoly rents, workers
would have a vested interest in their employer’s profits and would then benefit if their employer receives a
tax exemption.
14
ety j are affected by both aggregate and relative demand. The term labeled as aggregate
demand is familiar from the labor component of utility, as it is proportional to total con-
sumption. Aggregate demand is decreasing in the effective tax rate.





is the relative demand
for good j. This is the only term in citizens’ preferences where the statutory tax rate and
the tax base appear separately from the effective tax rate. A higher statutory tax rate τ
increases the relative price of–and lowers the relative demand for–goods that are in the
tax base. It lowers the profits of “taxed” firms: those that do not have a tax exemption.15
The tax base f determines whether a specific product is sheltered from taxation.
These two terms highlight how firms benefit from tax exemptions, but also bear a cost,
through the general equilibrium. Comparing the profits of a firm with, to one without, a
tax exemption, one can see the value of securing an individual tax exemption. Relative
demand for the product of the “exempt” firm is higher by a discrete margin. Accordingly,
this firm’s profits are higher by a discrete amount. Thus entrepreneurs have a strong
incentive to secure a tax exemption for their own product.
For a given revenue need, the effective tax rate τ̂ is minimized, however, by relying on
the broadest possible tax base. Aggregate demand is therefore harmed by a narrow tax
base. The aggregate demand term in (8) demonstrates that citizens internalize the cost of
their tax exemptions, even through their profits alone. However, the aggregate demand
cost of any single tax exemption is infinitesimal, while the benefits to its recipient are not.
No citizen would unilaterally forgo her own tax benefit. The aggregate demand channel
does leave scope, however, for a group of citizens to benefit from collectively forgoing
their tax exemptions.
Revenues The logarithm of tax revenues ρ (τ, f ) in (4) is given by





+ ζ (z, η, ε) , (9)
15Profits of all firms are taxed at a flat rate of τ, as can be seen in equation (2). I use the term “taxed
citizens” as shorthand for citizens owning firms producing goods that are not tax deductible.
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where ζ (z, η, ε) is a term that doesn’t contain the tax instruments f and τ. An increase
in either the tax base or the tax rate brings a direct proportional increase in tax revenues,
as captured by the first two terms in (9). The remaining terms reflect changes in taxable
income due to household responses. First, an increase in the effective tax rate decreases
revenues due to the standard substitution from consumption to leisure. In this case, it is
the effective rather than the statutory tax rate that determines the labor wedge. This effect
is proportional to the Frisch elasticity of labor supply η.
Tax revenues are further affected by revenue efficiency, captured by the term 1−τ1−τ̂ : the
ratio of the statutory and the effective net-of-tax rates. This ratio gives the wedge between
the prices of taxed goods and the CPI. The larger is the wedge, the greater is the substi-
tution from taxed to exempt goods, losing revenues due to tax exemptions. This second
effect is increasing in the elasticity of substitution across varieties: ε.
Figure 1 plots the government’s budget constraint for a number of values of g.16 Each
curve plots in { f , τ} space a set of tax base and rate combinations that lead to the same
revenues. The curves are downward sloping as broadening the base allows the govern-
ment to decrease statutory rates. Moving from left to right, these equi-revenue curves are
increasing in the revenues they generate.
3.2 Policy Preferences
Policy Preferences of Citizen j We can now solve for citizens’ policy preferences. It
follows directly from (7) that each citizen prefers the good she produces to be tax exempt.
We now ask how the citizen wishes to raise tax revenues taking her own tax status as
given. The preferred policy of citizen j is given by
16In this and all subsequent figures, the following parameter values are used. The Frisch elasticity of
labor supply is set at η = 0.5, an elasticity in the neighborhood of recent studies using microeconomic
data. The elasticity of substitution across varieties is set to ε = 2, following Broda and Weinstein (2006).
The relevant elasticity is that between taxable and tax exempt goods, which are typically in broad product
classifications such as health care, housing, or basic foodstuffs. The markup is set to µ = 1.1, as is common
in the macroeconomics literature. I state explicitly when results depend on parameter values. The chosen
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An interior policy choice satisfies the optimality condition:
MCPFτ (j) = MCPF f (j) ,
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are the marginal costs of public funds when a unit of tax revenues is raised by increasing
the tax rate and broadening the tax base, respectively. This optimality condition is intu-
itive: the citizen wants to use both policy instruments until the marginal costs of raising
an additional unit of revenues using either instrument is equalized.
However, as the following proposition states, the solution to the maximization prob-
lem is a corner solution at f = 1 if the effective tax rate is sufficiently small, specifically
if
(1− τ̂)ε−1 > (µ− 1) (ε− η − 2) . (10)
As citizens are identical except for the tax status of the good they produce, we use E
to denote any citizen producing a tax-exempt good and T to denote any citizen whose
product is in the tax base.
Proposition 1 When taxes are in the range given by (10), all citizens prefer raising taxes by
broadening the base rather than increasing rates, keeping their own tax status constant. That is
MCPFτ (j) > MCPF f (j) for any j ∈ {E, T} and any { f , τ} . f = 1 is therefore the preferred
policy of all citizens, keeping their own tax status constant.
It follows directly that a social welfare planner–putting an equal weight on the pref-
erences of each citizen–would always set f = 1. The intuition for this proposition is
illustrated in Figure 2, which plots utility of exempt (dashed curve) and taxed (solid line)
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citizens along equi-revenue curves. The horizontal axis shows values of the tax base f ,
but keep in mind that a broader tax base gives a lower statutory tax rate, as in Figure 1.
The gap between the two curves represents the discrete value of a tax exemption.
Broadening the tax base lowers the statutory tax rate, as we shift down and to the
right along an equi-revenue curve in Figure 1. All citizens benefit through a decrease in
the effective tax rate τ̂. The lower effective tax rate follows from the standard uniform
commodity taxation result: Lower statutory rates reduce the wedge between taxed and
exempt goods. In addition, citizens benefit directly from lower statutory tax rates afforded
by the increased revenue that broadening the base generates. Accordingly, the two curves
in Figure 2 are upward sloping: citizens prefer the broadest possible base. It follows that
the ideal policy for any citizen is at the right-most X marker: Set the broadest possible tax
base, while retaining her own tax exemption. This tension between a desire for a broad tax
base, on one hand, and for individual exemptions, on the other, is central to the politics of
tax reform.
Discussion of Condition (10) Proposition 1 requires that taxes be in the range repre-
sented by the inequality (10). This range is a sufficient condition for the remaining propo-
sitions in this article as well. The restriction imposed by (10) isn’t particularly constraining
for two reasons: one theoretical and one empirical.
First, theoretically, if distortions are so high that (10) is violated, it can be shown that
tax-exempt citizens become “tax loving ”. That is, they prefer tax rates to be high regard-
less of the revenue needs of the government. These perverse preferences arise because
when taxed and exempt goods are highly substitutable, higher tax rates strongly divert
demand from taxed goods to the exempt. When the effective tax rate is high (close to the
peak of the Laffer curve), this substitution effect is so strong that exempt citizens would
like to increase taxes even if the revenues are unused. The possibility that tax-sheltered
firms may prefer wasteful taxation may have some interesting implications, but these go
beyond the scope of this paper and needlessly complicates analysis.
Second, empirically, (10) holds for realistic parameterizations. The parameter ε is the
elasticity of substitution between varieties of goods. In our case, the relevant elasticity
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is that between taxed and tax-exempt goods. While some differentiated taxation exists
between narrowly defined products, the more relevant elasticity is between broader cate-
gories, such as food items vs. housing vs. automobiles. If we accordingly set ε = 2, fol-
lowing Broda and Weinstein (2006), then condition (10) holds for any value of the Frisch
elasticity η and any tax rate.
The Value of a Tax Exemption We now turn to a result that will be central in the
politics of tax reform, studied in Sections 4 and 5. Namely, a citizen’s willingness to pay
for a tax exemption is decreasing in the tax base. This can be seen graphically in Figure
2, where the willingness to pay for a tax exemption is the distance between the utility of
the exempt (dashed curve) and the utility of the taxed (solid curve). This gap narrows
as one moves from left to right in the figure, meaning that the value of a tax break is
decreasing in the tax base. This is a general feature of the model, as described in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 The individual value of a tax exemption is
1) Decreasing in the tax base f
2) Increasing in revenue needs g
3) Increasing in ε
The proposition also states that a citizen’s willingness to pay for a tax break is increas-
ing in public goods g and in the elasticity of substitution ε. The former can be seen in
Figure 3, which shows a comparison between the utility of taxed and exempt citizens for
several values of g. The curves further to the bottom of the figure reflect higher values
of public expenditure. As can be seen, the gap between the utility of the exempt and the
taxed is larger for curves representing higher public expenditure, so that citizens’ willing-
ness to pay for a tax exemption is increasing in g.
The intuition for these results is as follows. For a given revenue need, a broader tax
base allows a decrease in statutory tax rates τ. The value of a tax exemption is proportional
to the statutory tax rate, as can be seen in (7). The value of a tax exemption is therefore
decreasing in the tax base.17 Similarly, for a given tax base, an increase in g necessitates
17The broader tax base also reduces the effective tax rate τ̂, which further amplifies this effect.
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an increase in the statutory tax rate τ. This increases the relative cost of being in the tax
base and thus increases the value of a tax exemption. A higher elasticity of substitution ε
makes consumers more reactive to tax exemptions and makes it more attractive for a firm
to obtain one.
A corollary of Proposition 2 is that there are strategic complementarities in willing-
ness to pay for tax exemptions. The larger is the existing number of tax exemptions, the
narrower is the tax base. A narrower tax base increases citizens’ willingness to pay for ex-
emptions. In section 5, we will see how these strategic complementarities lead to multiple
equilibria in lobbying for tax breaks.
The Reform Tipping Point f R. Citizens prefer the broadest possible tax base on one
hand, but prefer to retain their own exemptions, on the other. Collectively, these two ob-
jectives are at odds with each other. When does the desire for a broader tax base outweigh
the parochial interest for an individual tax break? A tax exemption provides a discrete
gain for its beneficiary, while the gains from its elimination are infinitesimal. Hence, a
citizen would never unilaterally forgo a tax exemption. However, when the tax base is
narrow enough, beneficiaries from tax breaks are willing to collectively forgo their ex-
emptions in favor of tax reform: the elimination of all tax exemptions. This is illustrated
in Figure 2 with the marker labeled f R: the tipping point for reform. At a tax base nar-
rower than f R ( f < f R), exempt citizens are strictly better off reforming the tax system:
eliminating all tax exemptions. Thus a tax base narrower than f R provides an opportu-
nity to reform the tax system in a Pareto-improving way. Citizens, including the exempt,
are made better off by following the path along the right-pointing arrow in Figure 2. The
value of tax exemptions increases roughly linearly in tax rates, while the resulting dead-
weight losses are convex. Hence, a critical tax base f R exists, below which the latter force
dominates the former.
The following proposition states that the existence of a critical tax base f R is a general
result.
Proposition 3 For any feasible revenue need g > 0, there is a cutoff tax base f R ∈ (0, 1) so that
exempt citizens prefer tax reform of f = 1 to any tax base f < f R.
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There are two separate factors that might determine the reform-triggering tax base f R:
feasibility and preferences. Which of the two is binding depends on parameter values.
First, the revenue need g might exhaust the government’s fiscal capacity at the tax base of
f = f R. That is, revenues of g require taxing at the revenue-maximizing tax rate at this tax
base. As revenues at this point are increasing in f , no policy f < f R is feasible. Exempt
citizens are therefore forced to choose a tax base that is broader than f R.
Second, and more interestingly, there is a critical tax base at which exempt citizens are
exactly indifferent between tax reform and their own tax exemptions, as in Figure 2. The
exempt strictly prefer tax reform if f < f R and strictly prefer a tax base of f for all f > f R.
Discussion of Proposition 3 Proposition 3 describes the central mechanism that drives
or impedes reform in the political economy analysis that follows. Might special interests
truly be willing to forgo exemptions for the resulting general equilibrium gains? A few
points are worth noting in this regard.
First, the general equilibrium gains from tax reforms are sizable. Auerbach (1983) es-
timated the cost of distortions in the corporate tax code alone in the early 1980s at nearly
4% of the US capital stock, coming to more than 10% of GDP, giving large potential gains
from reform. Kopczuk (2005) estimates gains from the reduction in the elasticity of taxable
income due to broadening the personal income tax base in the 1986 TRA at around $30
billion a year.18 Gravelle (1989) estimates an additional $15 billion a year from changes in
the relative treatment of corporate and non-corporate capital. Jorgenson and Yun (1990)
simulate a number of the bill’s provisions and estimate total total gains as high as $1.5
trillion in net present value–nearly a third of GDP at the time. This is on top of the $80
billion of direct increases in disposable income due to rate reductions, increases in stan-
dard deductions, and increases in the Earned Income Tax Credit (Auerbach and Slemrod,
1997, Table 1), afforded by the base-broadening measures. Barro and Fuhrman (2018) es-
timate gains of 3% of GDP from the the December 2017 reform, if rules governing capital
expensing are made permanent. Mertens (2018) estimates these gains at 1.3% of GDP.
Second, the term “exempt citizens” may lead the reader to over-estimate the value of
18He estimates a 3pp reduction in the social cost of collecting a dollar of revenue, giving this figure using
1986 revenues.
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a tax exemption in this model. In the model corporate income (profits) are taxed at a flat
rate τ, with no exemptions. Instead, the product of an “exempt firm” is deductible from
ordinary income, as in (2). Thus firms benefit only indirectly due to the increase in relative
demand for their goods due to the lower consumer prices that the tax deduction affords.
It is this private benefit that firms need to weigh against the benefit of a lower tax rate and
stronger aggregate demand.
An example from the December 2017 tax bill is illustrative. The law broadened the tax
base by limiting mortgage interest deductions to apply only to the first $750, 000 of the
value of the mortgage (down from $1.1 million previously). The bill was opposed by the
National Association of Realtors, a major proponent of the mortgage interest deduction
and one of the strongest special interests in Washington.19 Why were lawmakers willing to
take on this immense special interest? This was perhaps somewhat aided by the fact that
this base-broadening measure helped finance the reduction in corporate income tax rates
from 35% to 21%. It is entirely plausible that the increase in after-tax profits to realtors
will turn out to be greater than the lost profits due to lower housing demand funded with
mortgages in the $750K− $1, 100K range.20
Third, shareholders are workers and taxpayers too. Citizens evaluate the net benefits
of reform based on both parts of their utility function in (7). The tipping point for reform
applies to utility not profits. In fact, at the tipping point f R, firms’ profits are harmed by
reform. This can be seen by the fact that reform increases citizens’ utility as workers–the
term uW in (7). Indifference to reform at f R therefore requires that the remaining term uπ–
profits–decrease from reform. There exists an even lower tax base at which even profits
alone would increase from reform, but this tax base is unlikely to ever be reached, as
Pareto-improving reform is available at higher tax bases.
This form of “cross-subsidization” is important in the politics of tax reform in practice.
The 1986 TRA is estimated to have increased the tax burden on the corporate sector as a
19It is the second largest in lobbying spending in Washington: https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?showYear=a&indexType=s.
The NAR also opposed the increase in the standard deduction and changes in the treatment of capital
income from house sales.
20Indeed, in a November 20 letter to the Senate, the NAR expressed “strong opposition to ‘The Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act,”’, but acknowledged that the “NAR supports tax reform’s goal to spur greater economic
growth”, corresponding to the competing forces described in the theory.
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whole (Auerbach and Slemrod, 1997, Table 1). But the reform also dramatically reduced
the top marginal personal income tax rate–relevant for many corporate shareholders–from
50% to 28% . This certainly will have sweetened the bitter pill for affected shareholders.
Finally, Proposition 3 is a stronger result than necessary for the political economy of
reform. In reality, there certainly are losers alongside beneficiaries of most reforms. But
the cost of reform to losers decreases, and its benefits to beneficiaries increases, as the
tax base narrows, as seen in Figure 2. Proposition 3 gives a limiting result that there
exists a tax base so narrow that even exempt citizens are willing to reform the system so
that reform is Pareto improving. In reality, the system may be reformed well before this
point is reached, when political resistance to reform erodes sufficiently. Indeed, Section
5 presents a lobbying model, in which reform passes against the (waning) resistance of
special interests when the tax base is sufficiently narrow.
Revenues and Tax Reform The tipping point for reform f R plays an important role
in the politics of tax reform. It is the critical tax base, below which special interests can
be persuaded to forgo tax exemptions. Conversely, 1− f R is the largest number of ex-
emptions that can be allocated to special interests before these interests are collectively
harmed by the porous tax system. What then determines the value of f R? It seems plau-
sible that support for tax reform increases with the revenue needs of the government.
Raising higher revenues on a narrow base may be more difficult and might require more
distortionary taxation. This is precisely what we see in Figure 3, which shows the utility
of taxed and exempt citizens for a number of values of g. Each pair of curves corresponds
to a specific value of g, with higher values of g lower in the figure. As before, the value
of f R is represented with an X: this is the tax base at which the utility of the exempt is
equal to the utility of the taxed under a reform of f = 1. As can be seen in the figure, f R is
increasing in g.
The following proposition formalizes this result. It states that f R is increasing in g for
sufficiently high values of g or ε.
Proposition 4 If public good needs g are sufficiently high, the cutoff tax base for reform f R is
increasing in g. In addition, f R is increasing in g for values of ε that are sufficiently high.
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The proposition gives a result for high values of g, meaning that we can say with
confidence that high (enough) values of g will lead to higher values of f R. The second part
of the proposition states that for values of ε sufficiently high, f R is increasing in g over the
entire range. Note that both these conditions are sufficient but neither of them is necessary.
In fact, I was unable to find a counterexample where f R wasn’t strictly increasing in g.
Computational analysis further affirms that f R is increasing in g for the entire range
of feasible values of the public good and for a broad range of parameter values. This is
illustrated in Figure 4 that shows the cutoff tax base f R as a function of public goods g.
The solid line plots results with parameter values as in the previous figures (ε = 2 and
η = 0.5). Other lines show alternative values of the elasticities ε and η, and the markup µ.
In all cases the critical tax base f R is increasing in public good needs g. This result will be
central in the prediction that tax reform is more likely when public good needs are greater.
3.3 Active Ingredients
The results in this section are based on a model with standard, but specific, preferences.
This allows for analytical proofs and graphical analysis. But to what extent do the results
presented here generalize further? To answer this, it is useful to consider the active ingre-
dients leading to the main results. The general equilibrium gains from reform come from
two forces that are quite general. First, differential tax treatment of goods leads to dead-
weight losses. This is a general result and follows from the theory of uniform commodity
taxation harking back to Ramsey (1927) and outlined in many public finance textbooks
(e.g. Atkinson and Stiglitz, 2015). The theory recommends taxing goods differentially
based on their demand elasticity, but this is unlikely the main reason for most tax exemp-
tions in practice. Second, differential taxation, beyond distorting consumption bundles,
also leads to a larger labor wedge. This too is quite general. Differential taxation leads to
a higher price level with constant elasticity of substitution preferences over commodities,
as seen in (3). But this generalizes to other preferences as long as deadweight losses from
taxation of individual commodities are convex. A higher price level then increases the
price of leisure relative to consumption, distorting work incentives.
A narrower tax base leads to a higher statutory tax rate, creating a larger diversion of
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consumption from taxed to deductible goods. When the two aforementioned assumptions
hold, this leads to a more distorted consumption bundle and lower utility. This force
might trigger reform at narrow tax bases, but will not be sufficient alone to reduce profits
for producers of tax-exempt goods. The increasing labor wedge delivers this result: A
more distorted consumption bundle makes consumption less attractive relative to leisure
(higher price level), reduces hours worked, demand, and corporate profits.
The notion that there exists a critical tax base below which exempt citizens may sup-
port reform does depend on parametric assumptions. As noted earlier, if condition (10)
is violated (e.g the elasticity of substitution across products is sufficiently large), the di-
version of relative demand towards tax exempt goods is so great that tax exemptions may
become irresistible. Of course, in any model, the tax base may be so narrow that ultimately
revenue needs cannot be satisfied, but this reflects a far more mechanical budgetary rea-
son for tax reform.
The strategic complementarity in vying for tax exemptions should also generalize to
other settings. The result follows from the fact that a narrower tax base requires higher
tax rates: a simple fiscal reality. When tax rates are higher, the value of being exempt from
taxation is greater: again, a general result.
The assumption that firms are of zero measure is for analytical convenience, but not
central to the model’s results. One can think of any measure of firms in the model as being
a large multi-product conglomerate. If anything, this larger firm would be more likely to
internalize general equilibrium effects and wouldn’t face the collective action problem
that a larger number of firms faces.
Results reported in this section go through if deductible goods obtain a deduction of
less than 100%. This more general case is analyzed in Appendix A.4. Partial deductions
have two competing effects on the pivotal tax base f R. On one hand, partial exemptions
are less distortionary, reducing their general equilibrium cost. On the other hand, partial
deductions are less valuable to exempt citizens, thus lowering their private value. As
shown in the appendix, for a reasonable parameterization of the model, these two forces
roughly cancel out.21
21Note, however, that the parameter f no longer represents the tax base, when exemptions are partial.
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Relaxing the assumption that consumers have homogeneous preferences over com-
modities may affect results and certainly has real-world political economy implications.
In practice, consumers differ in their consumption bundles and benefit differentially from
tax deductions. The mortgage interest deduction benefits mortgagors, not only realtors,
for example. The result that “workers” are identical in preferences, and always support
reform, is an artifact of this stark assumption. Introducing ex-ante differences in consumer
preferences on top of the ex-post difference in firms’ tax status would complicate analy-
sis substantially. While the rich political interaction between consumer advocacy groups
and corporate interests is certainly intriguing, it goes beyond the scope of this paper and
I leave it to future research.
4 Normative Analysis: Big Bang or Piecemeal Reform?
Using the economic model we have derived, we now turn to the politics of tax reform. In
this section, we begin with normative analysis and ask whether economies should elim-
inate the rents to entrenched interests in one fell swoop, or is a more gradual approach
desirable? In Section 2, I discussed a number of recent cases and we saw that large re-
forms were common in tax policy. Are such big-bang reforms desirable?
Consider the case of a “reformist” policymaker (PM) who aims to maximize social
welfare and therefore wants to maximize the tax base. However, she is restricted to re-
forms that obtain unanimous support. This may represent an extreme case of multiple
veto points, but illustrates the case for big bang reform clearly. Looking at Figure 2, imag-
ine that current policy has a tax base of f = f R (or any value f < f R). The reform-
minded leader wants to eliminate all special provisions in the tax code and set f = 1.
Now consider the merits of gradualism or more ambitious reform in this context. At the
“big bang” extreme, the reformer removes all tax exemptions at once. This is represented
by the rightward-pointing arrow in Figure 2. By the definition of f R, special interests
are no worse off under reform than under the status quo and reform is Pareto improving.
Instead, the tax base–defined as the share of total expenditure that is taxed–is roughly 1− (1− f )χ, where
χ is the share of expenditure on exempt goods that is tax deductible.
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Special interests are compensated directly by the general equilibrium benefits from reform
and there are no losers in need of compensation.
At the gradualist extreme, the reformer could eliminate one tax exemption at a time.
Compensating the first special interest is costly, with the cost represented by the downward-
pointing arrow in Figure 2. The total cost of reform, when removing tax exemptions one at
a time and compensating losers sequentially, is the area between the two curves in figure
2 to the right of f = f R. This is obviously larger than the zero cost incurred under a big
bang reform.22 This result is generalized and summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 If the status quo tax base satisfies f q ≤ f R, a welfare-maximizing reformist who
is required to raise revenues to fully compensate all losers from reform will prefer a reform of f = 1
to any f q < f < 1.
Central to this result is the general equilibrium nature of this framework and its im-
plications for Pareto-improving reform outlined in Proposition 3. One typically thinks
of reform as being welfare increasing. It is the distributional consequences that stand in
the way of reform, with losers leveraging their political power to block its enactment. By
setting the agenda appropriately as a choice between a large “big bang” change and the
status quo, a reform-minded politician may be able to obtain broad support for reform
with limited need to compensate losers.
The debate on gradualism vs. big-bang reforms has a long history. A large literature
in the early 1990s debated whether large reforms were preferable to piecemeal ones with
particular reference to the transition economies of the former Soviet bloc. Dewatripont
and Roland (1992) argued for gradualism, due to informational asymmetries. They ask
what a reform-minded leader ought to do when faced with special interests: workers that
must be compensated when exiting a restructured industry. They conclude that gradual-
ism is preferable, because it allows the government to screen workers for the value they
place on remaining in the existing industry and thus reduce the total compensation re-
quired. The context of tax reform is different. The losers from tax reform are relatively
22The ultimate payoffs from reform are not path dependent. But if the policy maker cannot commit to
follow through with this gradual reform, special interests may nevertheless demand compensation along a
gradual reform path.
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easy to identify: it is those groups that currently have tax exemptions. Our mechanism is
entirely different and relies on the complementarity between individual tax exemptions,
which make the cost of “buying out” special interests smaller, the larger the number of
exemptions that is eliminated.
In contrast, Murphy et al (1992) argue in favor of big-bang reform. They study lib-
eralization of product markets in a transition economy and argue that a partial reform
may introduce new price distortions. It is therefore desirable to transition in one step. In
contrast, in the model presented here, partial reform does reduce inefficiency. As Figure 2
illustrates, any broadening of the tax base is a step in the right direction. Instead, I argue
that a big bang reform is desirable due to the complementarities in tax exemptions studied
in Proposition 2. Special interests benefit more from tax exemptions when other groups
also have exemptions. Partial reform eliminates some exemptions but leaves others in
place. A special interest losing its exemptions will therefore require larger compensation
in a partial reform.
5 Positive Analysis: Tax Reform and Public Good Needs
I have suggested that base-broadening tax reform often occurs when there is a perceived
need for fiscal consolidation. In this section, I use positive political economy theory to
analyze how public good needs affect the tax base. Many of the results will follow from
Proposition 4 and Figure 3. f R is increasing in g, which means that the size of a coalition
that collectively prefers tax reform to tax exemptions (1− f R) is decreasing in public good
needs. In many political settings (e.g. median voter model) this directly implies that tax
reform is more likely when public good needs are greater.
The economic setting of Section 3 and its resulting payoffs call attention to the conflict
between general and special interests. In addition, lobbying appears to have played an
important role the political history of tax reform: Birnbaum and Murray (1987) give a
blow-by-blow account of the role of lobbies in resisting and then resigning themselves to
the 1986 TRA. A lobbying model is therefore a natural setting to explore the politics of this
conflict. Substantial lobbying effort is devoted to protecting the types of tax deductions
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studied here. The National Association of Realtors is the second largest organization in
lobbying expenditure in the U.S. and protecting the mortgage interest deduction is one
of its main objectives. Blue Cross/Blue Shield provides more lobbying contributions than
any other individual firm and it certainly benefits from the deductibility of employer-
provided health insurance .23
I begin with the canonical Grossman and Helpman (2002, chapter 7) lobbying model.
The model predicts that tax reform occurs when public goods g are high. I then extend
the model to allow endogenous citizen participation in the lobby. In this case, strategic
complementarities in the value of tax exemptions, summarized in Proposition 2, come
into play. Strategic complementarity creates two equilibria, one with substantial lobbying
and a narrow tax base and another with limited lobbying and a broader base. Finally, I
summarize a number of extensions and alternative political models. The prediction that
base-broadening reforms are more likely when public good needs are higher is robust to
a variety of specifications.
5.1 Lobbying
The lobbying model follows Grossman and Helpman (2002, chapter 7) closely. A mea-
sure L of citizens is organized in a single lobby. The lobby is headed by a representative
member and consists of a group of citizens that indistinguishable in terms of the tax code.
That is, it is administratively impossible to exempt a subset of lobby members without
exempting the entire lobby from tax. In Section 5.3, I discuss an extension that allows
more flexibility in the tax code. Lobby size is exogenous to begin with, but is endogenized
in Section 5.2. The model will have nothing to say about how the collective action prob-
lem within the lobby is resolved, as is the case with most existing lobbying models. There
also exists a policymaker (PM) who determines the tax code { f , τ} , including which 1− f
citizens obtain tax exemptions. The PM herself is not a citizen in this economy.
The lobby can make binding commitments to transfer consumption goods to the pol-
icymaker (PM), conditional on policy. Having observed public good needs g, it offers
a contribution schedule C ( f , τ) , giving the size of the transfer if the PM sets policy to
23https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?showYear=2017&indexType=s
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{ f , τ} . The lobby may also condition the transfer on the identity of the 1 − f varieties
that are tax exempt. However, given that the PM will never give tax exemptions to lobby
non-members in equilibrium, we anticipate that the 1− f agents who receive the exemp-
tion are always lobby members. Hence { f , τ} fully summarizes payoffs to the PM and the
lobby.
The PM values both public policy and contributions, with weights Λ and 1 − Λ on
these two objectives, respectively. In terms of public policy, the PM values social welfare,
with equal weights for all citizens. Accordingly, the PM’s objective is
uPM ( f , τ) = ΛuSWP ( f , τ) + (1−Λ)C ( f , τ) .
As Grossman and Helpman (2002, chapter 7) show, policy in this environment is Pareto
efficient for the PM and the lobby, and policy maximizes a weighted average of social
welfare and the utility of the lobby:
ũPM ( f , τ) = ΛuSWP ( f , τ) + (1−Λ) LuL ( f , τ)
where uL ( f , τ) is the utility of the average lobby member. On observing g, the PM chooses
policy to maximize ũPM ( f , τ) subject to the budget constraint ρ ( f , τ) ≥ g. The equilib-
rium outcome is f = 1− L (lobby exempt) for lower levels of g and f = 1 (tax reform) for
higher levels.
Proposition 6 In the lobbying model, tax reform occurs if public good needs g are sufficiently
high.
This result is a direct corollary of Propositions 1 to 4. Proposition 1 implies that the
PM will never give tax exemptions to lobby non-members, so that f ≥ 1− L. Given that
policy cannot discriminate between lobby members, the PM has two options: f = 1− L or
f = 1. These two options correspond to an unreformed system, where the lobby receives
tax breaks or a reformed tax system, respectively. Taking the extreme case of Λ → 0 (PM
cares only about contributions) as an example, it is easy to see that tax reform occurs at
high public good levels. With Λ = 0, the PM maximizes lobby welfare and Proposition
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3 implies that 1− f R is the largest measure of tax exemptions that is sustainable before
the beneficiaries themselves prefer to reform the tax system. Hence tax reform occurs if
and only if L ≥ 1− f R. Notice that this is a limiting case: if the PM puts any weight on
the welfare of non-lobbyists, reform occurs at tax bases broader than fR and potentially
against lobby resistance.
Further, Proposition 4 and Figure 3 show that f R is increasing in g. It follows that tax
reform will be triggered for sufficiently large public good needs. If the PM is policy moti-
vated (Λ > 0), this continues to be the case because the taxed lobby non-members always
prefer tax reform and value tax reform more the higher are public goods. In conclusion, a
simple lobbying model predicts that tax reform occurs when public good needs are high.
Comment on Big Bang Reforms The lobbying model predicts that tax reform occurs
at high levels of g. This result is robust to a number of extensions and alternative political
models discussed in Section 5.3 and is consistent with base-broadening tax reforms in
OECD countries, as discussed in Section 2 and shown in Appendix A.2. In the previous
section, we saw that big bang reforms may be easier for a reform-minded policymaker to
implement. It is less clear from the positive analysis put forth in this section whether big
bang reforms are more likely than marginal ones. In the baseline lobbying model I have
presented, reforms also have a big bang nature in that a discrete increase in public goods
triggers a substantial increase in the tax base. In some of the extensions discussed below,
we will see that this result is due to two assumptions in the baseline model. Specifically,
there are two discrete components of the model that together drive the big bang result.
The first assumption is that the tax code cannot distinguish between lobby members. If
this assumption is relaxed, the lobby and PM could agree to remove the tax exemption of
a single lobby member rather than the exemptions of all its members. Hence, there may be
no critical level of public goods where a marginal increase in g leads to a discrete reform.
The tax base broadens when g increases, but not in a discrete jump. Non-discrimination
among lobby members may hold in practice if lobby members are relatively homogeneous
and belong to a certain class (income bracket, industry, age group) that tends to be treated
similarly in the tax code for administrative or political reasons. The assumption may
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also hold if non-discrimination among lobby members is important for internal lobby
cohesion.
The second assumption is that tax exemptions involve a deduction that can only take a
discrete set of values. In the model presented here, I restricted attention to two values–full
deductability or none–but discrete reform occurs for any finite number of brackets. If a
continuum of brackets is allowed, the lobby and PM may agree to decrease the exemption
on the margin rather than eliminate it entirely. Hence, there may be no discrete reform
due to a marginal increase in g, but the tax base does broaden, in the sense that the wedge
between taxed and exempt goods is narrowed.
5.2 Endogenous Lobby Membership
I now extend the model to allow endogenous lobby membership. Prior to the lobbying
stage of Section 5.1 and before the value of g is known, citizens choose whether to partic-
ipate in the lobby or not. It is known that g will be drawn from a probability distribution
function γ (g) . A citizen j may join the lobby at a fixed cost of φj units of the consumption
good. For expositional ease, assume that this cost is the same for all citizens φj = φ ∀j,
but results are robust to any distribution of fixed costs across citizens. The fixed cost is in
addition to the per-capita contributions C( f ,τ)L to the PM in the lobbying stage. One can
think of the fixed cost as a membership fee that covers the administrative cost of special
interest group organization or time and effort devoted to lobbying.
Citizen j’s lobbying strategy consists of a probability of lobbying as a function of the
equilibrium lobby size L. Let qj (L) denote the probability that citizen j joins a lobby of
size L. A Nash equilibrium is a lobby size L and a set of lobbying probability functions{
qj (L)
}1
j=0 such that (i) each citizen’s lobbying probability maximizes her expected pay-
off and (ii) the resultant measure of lobbyists is consistent with the entry probability of




Cost and Benefit of Lobby Membership To understand citizens’ lobby membership
choice, consider the expected cost and benefit of membership. The cost is straightforward
and is captured by the fixed cost φ. In studying expected benefits, consider first the benefit
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citizen j obtains from being in the lobby if a value g is realized in the second stage. We’ll
use B (L, g) to denote the benefit to lobbying as a function lobby size at a public good
level of g. The benefit is equal to the lobby members’ policy rents net of per-member
lobby contributions to the PM. If the lobby receives a tax exemption, B (L, g) = uE ( f , τ)−
uT ( f , τ)− C( f ,τ)L , where the policy { f , τ} is the equilibrium outcome of the lobbying stage.
Under tax reform, B (L, g) = 0, as lobby members receive no policy rents but also make
no contributions to the PM.
The costs and benefits of membership are shown in Figure 5 for two different values
of g and taking the limit Λ → 0 (the PM cares only about contributions) for simplicity.
At this limit, the PM sets policy to maximize the lobby’s utility and the lobby captures
all policy rents C ( f , τ) → 0. The figure gives the benefit of lobbying as a function of
L. As previously discussed, tax reform will occur if and only if L ≥ 1 − f R. Absent
reform, lobbyists obtain tax exemptions and the tax base is f = 1− L. Accordingly, for all
L ≤ 1− f R, the curve shows uE (1− L, τ (1− L))− uT (1− L, τ (1− L)), where τ (1− L)
is the tax rate that gives g units of revenues when the tax base is 1− L. The figure shows
that this benefit is increasing in L. This follows from Proposition 2 and is precisely a mirror
image of the net benefits to a tax exemption from Figure 2. It is a mirror image because a
larger lobby L translates one to one into a narrower tax base f . If L > 1− f R, the resulting
policy is tax reform ( f = 1) and the gross benefit to lobby membership is zero. This is
represented by the discrete downward jump to zero in the benefit of lobbying in Figure 5.
The benefit of lobbying changes with public goods as could be expected from our anal-
ysis in section 3. A high value of g shifts the curve upwards. This follows from Proposition
2 and was shown in Figure 3: The value of a tax break is increasing in g. However, f R is
also increasing in g, as shown in Figure 3 and Proposition 4. As g increases, the cutoff
1− f R–where the benefit of lobbying goes to zero–therefore shifts to the left in Figure 5.
With greater public good needs, there is a greater incentive to secure a tax exemption.
On the other hand, with greater public good needs, a smaller number exemptions can be
sustained.
Figure 6 shows the cost and expected benefit of membership for an individual citizen
in a lobby of size L. The two horizontal lines correspond to two values of the entry
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cost φ. Expected benefits are represented by the inverted-U-shape curve and are sim-
ply a weighted integral over the benefit function of Figure 5 over all possible values of
g: Eg {B (L, g)} =
∫
g B (L, g) γ (g) dg. The figure shows the expected benefits of lobby-
ing for a specific PDF function (normally distributed around a mean value of g) and the
curve may differ depending on the distribution. Specifically, other distributions might
have multiple peaks rather than the single peak shown in the figure. But two features of
this curve hold for any distribution and are central to the description of equilibrium.
First, this curve is increasing at L = 0. Expected benefits in the neighborhood of L =
0 are simply a weighted average (over values of g) of the benefits of a tax exemption
uE − uT. The benefits of a tax exemption are decreasing in the tax base for any value of g
(Proposition 2). Equivalently, the expected benefit of lobby membership is increasing in L
at L = 0.
Second, for L sufficiently high, the expected benefit of lobbying is zero. If L is suf-
ficiently high, then L must necessarily exceed 1 − f R for all g. Tax reform occurs with
probability one and the expected benefit of lobbying is zero. The general shape of the
expected benefits of lobbying as a function of number of lobbyists is therefore as shown
in Figure 6. The function is increasing for low values of L and ultimately decreasing to
zero. The function has at least one peak (but may have multiple peaks and therefore is not
generally inverted-U-shaped).
Equilibrium Number of Lobbyists Figure 6 illustrates how equilibrium is deter-
mined. An equilibrium is a lobby size L and a set of probabilities qj (L) such that (i)
for each j, the expected benefit of membership equals the expected cost and (ii) lobbying
probabilities lead to a lobby of size L.
Considering first the low lobbying cost, the unique equilibrium lobby size is indicated
with a circle. There is a large set of lobbying probability functions qj (L) that support
equilibrium, but all have a fixed point at the unique value of L represented with a circle.
For example, one equilibrium is symmetrical with all citizens choosing q (L) = L∗, where
L∗ is the equilibrium measure of lobbyists. Another equilibrium has a measure L∗ of
citizens lobbying with probability one and the remainder lobbying with probability zero.
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For the low lobbying cost, equilibrium unfolds as follows. First, a measure L∗ of citi-
zens joins the lobby in the first stage. Second, the value of g is drawn, with a correspond-
ing value of f R. If L∗ < 1− f R, the equilibrium tax base is f = 1− L∗ with tax breaks
going to all lobbyists. If L∗ > 1− f R, the equilibrium tax base is f = 1: tax reform.




, indicated with a cross in the figure gives the number
of entering lobbyists that leads to reform with a 50% probability. With the low lobbying




: The probability of tax reform is greater
than 50%. A large number of citizens nevertheless lobbies because the cost of lobbying
is low. They are willing to incur the lobbying cost to secure a tax break if exemptions are
allocated. This points to a more general insight. Lower fixed lobbying costs lead to greater
lobby membership but to a higher probability of tax reform. It is hardly surprising that
lower fixed costs encourage entry. But lower lobbying costs also democratize the lobbying
process and more citizens are represented at the table when tax breaks are allocated. When
budgetary conditions allow (g is sufficiently low), tax exemptions are distributed liberally
and the tax base is narrow. However, the large number of organized citizens puts high
demands on the tax system. Even moderate public good needs induce tax reform. At the
extreme, as lobbying costs approach zero, L approaches 1, and tax reform always passes.
If all citizens lobby, they all receive equal weight, and policy is as a social planner would
choose.
In the higher lobbying cost scenario there are two equilibria, indicated with squares
in Figure 6. The right-most equilibrium parallels the low lobbying cost case. The cost of
lobbying equals its expected benefits at this point. In the high lobbying cost scenario, an
additional equilibrium exists at L = 0. If no one enters the lobby, the cost of lobbying
exceeds its expected benefits and no individual citizen wishes to lobby.24 Multiple equi-
libria are not a curiosity of this specific lobbying framework, but a more general feature
of the economic setting. As noted in Proposition 2 and shown in Figure 2, the payoff from
a tax exemption is decreasing in the tax base. This leads to strategic complementarity in
lobbying for tax breaks. The larger the number of lobbyists, the larger are the returns to
24The remaining intersection between the cost and expected benefit curves is not an equilibrium. With
this measure of lobbyists, a citizen could deviate by increasing her lobbying probability and the expected
benefits of lobbying would exceed its cost.
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lobbying for other citizens. In one equilibrium, there is little lobbying so that the tax base
is broad. With a broad tax base, the benefits of a tax break are small and exceed the cost
of lobbying. In the other equilibrium, the lobby is large and the tax base is likely narrow.
With a narrow tax base, the benefit of a tax break is large and justify the cost of lobbying.25
5.3 Extensions, Robustness, and Other Political Settings
I make a number of simplifying assumptions in the discussion above. As mentioned ear-
lier, the result that reform occurs when g is high is robust. I now summarize a number of
the assumptions and their implications.
I introduced uncertainty in public good needs to smooth citizens’ preferences. Discrete
jumps in preferences pose problems for equilibrium existence and introducing uncertainty
is one way to pin down equilibrium.
The fixed cost to lobbying in Section 5.2 is a reasonable, but critical, assumption. With
no fixed costs all citizens would lobby and f = 1 is always the unique equilibrium. Our
main political concern is the conflict between special and general interests and the fixed
cost allows us to make this distinction.
The analysis of endogenous lobby membership assumed that the lobby obtained all
policy rents. A more general specification where the PM obtains a share of the rents leads
to qualitatively similar results.
Graphical results showed the case where all citizens had the same lobby membership
cost (φi = φ). A model with heterogeneous lobbying costs could help pin down the equi-
librium identity of lobbying citizens, but would not change the qualitative nature of ag-
gregate outcomes. Not surprisingly, citizens with lower lobbying costs are more likely to
lobby.
As noted earlier, whether reform is big bang depends on the assumption that the PM
cannot discriminate between lobby members. A more general specification where the
lobby and PM are allowed to agree on tax breaks for (a randomly selected) subset of lobby
members is otherwise similar in its qualitative predictions. High g will lead to reform in
25If the cost of lobbying is so high so as to exceed its expected benefit everywhere, the unique equilibrium
is L = 0 and therefore f = 1.
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the sense that the tax base will be increasing in g, but the tax base increases smoothly in g.
The results from Section 5.2 follow through as well.
In Appendix A.5, I analyze an extended model that allows the PM to choose the tax
base on both the extensive and intensive margins. That is, the PM may decide on both
the number and the size of exemptions. As g increases, the tax base increases on both
margins: fewer exemptions are allocated and the size of the exemption declines.
The appendix also shows that extensions where government spending is endogenous
(A.3) and where firms have heterogeneous productivities (A.6) lead to similar results. The
appendix also contains an analysis of a Downsian voting model (A.7), a legislative bar-
gaining model (A.8), and a model where policy is set by a planner with arbitrary weights
on the welfare of each citizen (A.9). All predict that tax reform is more likely as g increases.
In summary, the prediction that tax reform occurs at high levels of the public good is
robust to modeling assumptions. It is also robust to other political models, including a
simple median voter model.
6 Concluding Remarks
Determining the tax base is a highly political process. Reformers’ desire to bring about
a simpler, more efficient, and “fairer” tax system is often stonewalled because of the dis-
tributional consequences of such change. This paper proposes a tractable model of the
political economy of the tax base. When revenue needs are low, they can be met more eas-
ily with narrow tax bases. Special interests focus on securing parochial tax benefits, each
of which has a only minor implications for overall efficiency, but combined may bring
significant dead-weight losses. But greater revenue needs are more costly to fund with
a narrow tax base. Special interests become increasingly willing to forgo their own tax
breaks in favor of efficiency as revenues increase. Eventually, tax reform is feasible.
At a first glance, it may appear that it would be easier to broaden the tax base through
a divide-and-conquer strategy that takes on one special interest at a time. The model
proposed here shows that tax exemptions to multiple groups are strategic complements.
Special interests will invest greater resources in fighting reform when the tax base is nar-
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row. Base-broadening tax reforms may therefore not be etching at the margin of the tax
code, but a significant overhaul of the tax system. The general equilibrium benefits are
small if only one special interest is confronted. But forging a grand bargain where a num-
ber of special interests is targeted simultaneously may improve efficiency sufficiently to
compensate all losers.
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Figure 1: Budget Curves

























This figure shows budget curves. Points along each curve are combinations of a tax base f and
a statutory tax rate τ that raise the same revenues. The curves further to the right raise higher
revenues. Parameter values here and in later figures: η = 0.5, ε = 2, µ = 1.1.
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Figure 2: Utility of Taxed and Exempt Along A Budget Curve


























The curves show the utility of citizens whose firm has a tax exemption (dashed line) and those who
are not exempt (solid line) as a function of the tax base f . The curves are along a balanced-budget
path, i.e. all points on the curves raise the same amount of revenues. The leftmost marker (X) is
the utility maximizing policy for a citizen: the broadest possible tax base, while retaining her own
tax exemption. The point f R is the tax base that is the tipping point for reform. At this tax base,
exempt citizens are indifferent between retaining their exemption and a tax reform that eliminates
all exemptions. The two arrows represent utility losses to losers from reform. The downward
arrow is the loss of utility as part of a gradual reform that eliminates one tax exemption at a time.
The rightward arrow represents the loss of utility (equaling zero) as part of a “big bang” reform
that eliminates all exemptions simultaneously.
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Figure 3: Utility of the Taxed and Exempt for Several Values of g
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This figure shows the utility of citizens with tax exemptions (dashed lines) and those who are taxed
(solid lines). Each pair of curves represents a specific value of the public good g. Curves further
to the bottom reflect higher levels of g. The Xs indicate the tax base that triggers reform for that
level of public goods: f R. This is the tax base that leaves the exempt indifferent between a reform
that eliminates all exemptions and a tax exemption at that tax base. The figure illustrates that f R
is increasing in g. It also shows that the value of a tax exemption–the gap between the dashed and
solid lines–is increasing in g.
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fR as a Function of g
Public goods g
fR
This figure shows the reform-triggering tax base f R as a function of g, for several parameteriza-
tions. In all cases, f R is increasing in g. The solid line uses the benchmark parametrization of
η = 0.5, ε = 2, µ = 1.1. The circle markers use ε = 1. The square markers use η = 1. The cross
markers use µ = 1.05.
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Figure 5: The Benefit of Lobbying vs. the Number of Lobbyists
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The benefit of lobbying is plotted against the number of lobbyists entering the lobbying game, for
two values of g. The benefit of lobbying is the value of a tax exemption, if tax exemptions are
distributed in equilibrium. This benefit is decreasing in the tax base and therefore increasing in
the number of lobbyists, as long as exemptions are allocated. There is a discrete downward jump
in the value of lobbying where tax reform is enacted. Higher values of g increase the value of
tax exemptions when they are distributed, but also reduces the number of lobbyists that can be
sustained in equilibrium before reform is passed.
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Figure 6: The Cost and Expected Benefit of Lobbying
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The expected benefit of lobbying is plotted against the number of lobbyists, before the value of
public goods g is realized. In this figure, g is drawn from a normal distribution, but the general
shape of the curve would be similar for any distribution. Two values of φ, the entry cost, are
plotted. For the low lobbying cost, equilibrium is at the circle where costs and expected benefits
are equal. The two equilibria for the high cost are shown in squares. The cross indicates one minus
the tax base that leads to tax reform with probability 12 .
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